Monday, January 7, 2013

The Kentucky Law Reporter, Volume 23 - Graziani v. Hall


Graziani v. Hall &c.
(Filed March 13, 1902 – Not to be reported.)

            Bills and notes – Where two sureties took up the note of their principal and executed their own, they became joint principals, and either of them could have maintained an action against the principal for the amount paid for him on the note. Their relation to the bank and to each other was that of joint principals, and in a suit by either against the other upon the note it was not necessary for him to allege or prove the insolvency of the original maker.
H.D Gregory for appellant.
W.C. Hall for appellees.
Appeal from Kenton Circuit Court.
Opinion of the court by Judge Burnam
In 1895 the appellant, B.F. Graziani, and the appellees, W.C. Hall and John A. Hall, purchased a tract of  about thirty acres of land near Covington for the purpose of plating into streets and lots and selling; and to facilitate the business of the South Dinmore Park Land Co. was organized and the major part of the land conveyed to it. It was deemed advisable to secure the services of an active young German to act as secretary and assist in the sale of the stock and property of the company, and with this view F.W. Schmitz was employed. To enable him to purchase stock in the company the appellant and appellees signed his note for $1,300 as joint securities to the Farmers and Traders Natoinal Bank of Covington, which sum was paid by Schimtz(sic) to the appellant and appellees for thirteen shares of stock in the company. Schmitz was thereupon elected secretary and a director of the company. He subsequently sold five shares of the stock for $500 to William Reidlin, and applied the purchase money to his note to the bank, reducing it to $800. On the 25th of September, 1895, the directors of the company adopted the following resolution: “The South Dinmore Park Land Co. will convey to any stock holder land in its subdivision at a price to be agreed upon by such stockholder and the directors of the company to the extent of  money actually paid by such stockholder as assessed on stock, provided said stockholder would erect a house upon the lot, costing not less than $900. The conveyance of the land was not to be made until the house was under roof, and the price of the land was to be charged to the stockholder and bear interest at 6 per cent. From the day of conveyance, and the stockholder thus taking land should not further participate in the profit of the company until all other stockholders had dividends from the company that made them equal to the stockholders taking land.”
            Pursuant to this resolution, Schmitz purchased from the company four lots and erected a dwelling house thereon, at a cost of about $2,600. The appellant, Graziani, became bound for this money, and subsequently was compelled to pay it, and in June, 1896, he and Schmitz entered into an agreement by which Graziani was subsitituted in place of Schmitz as the purchaser of the lots, and their price was charged to him, credited back to Schmitz, and the land company convyed the lots to appellant by general warranty deed, and Schmitz’s connection with the land company ceased. Appellant and appellees after this transaction paid off the note of Schmitz to the bank by the execution of their joint obligation to the bank for the balance due thereon. This note was renewed by them several times prior to the 9th day of June, 1889, when upon the demand of the bank appellant paid the full amount of the note, $900.
            He tehreupon instituted this suit, in which he alleged that John A. Hall was insolvent and asked a personal judgement against the appellee, W.C. Hall, for $450, one-half of the amount paid by him to the bank. W.C. Hall answered, admitting the execution of the ntoe, but alleged by way of defense that at the time of the execution of the original obligation by Schmitz, on which he and appellant were bound as co securities, that it was agreed by appellant, who was president of the copmany, that he would not permit the isual to Schmitz of his stock, but would hold it as a security or the amount of his note; and he further agreed that no deed should be made to Schmitz for the lots selected by him until he had paid off his note to the bank; and that appellant had also agreed that he would see that all moneys due from the company to Schmitz for services as secretary were applied to the payment of the note. The affirmative averments of the answer were denied by reply, and a jury trial resulted in a verdict for appellant. Thereupon the defendant filed a motion for a judgement notwithstanding the verdict. On the next day, before this motion was passed upon, they filed grounds and entered motion for a new trial. The trial court sustained the motion for judgement non obstanti verdicto, and dismissed the petition. The motion for a new trial was not acted on at all. In brief of counsel it is said that this action of the trial court was based upon the theory that this was an action for contribution by one co-security against another, and that in the absense of allegation and proof of the insolvency of the joint principal appellee was entiteled to a nonsuit. We think that the trial judge proceeded upon an entirely erroneous theory. When appellant and the appellees took up the note of Schmitz and executed their own, they become joint principals, and either of them at that time could have maintained a suit against Schmitz for the amount paid for him on the note. Their relations to the bank and to each other, after the execution of their obligation, was that of joint principlas and not securites, and in a suit by appellant upon the note, it was unnecessary for him either to have alleged or proved the involvency of the orginial maker. The execution of the note itself was an implied admission of this fact. We are, therefore, of the the opinion that the trial judge erred in sustaining the motino for a judgement nonwithstanding the verdict.
            And for this reason the judgement is reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Kentucky Law Reporter, Volume 23
Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=a3AsAQAAMAAJ&lpg=PA2352&ots=pwhRxv5b7X&dq=South%20Dinmore%20Park%20Land%20Company&pg=PA2349#v=onepage&q&f=false
Page 2351-2353

Thinking the four lots and "dwelling" is a mention of my home on Earle Ave. It was built around 1896/97, sits on four lots, and the deed is under Mr. Graziani's name. Going to see if I can find out more about F.W. Schmitz.

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